Abstract. This paper investigates the impact of non-interest income businesses on bank lending. Using quarterly data on 8,287 U.S. commercial banks over 2003-2010, we find that the non-interest income activities of banks with total assets above $100 million ('non-micro' banks) influence credit risk. In particular, banks that have higher income from fiduciary activities have lower credit risk. The impact is more pronounced during the post-crisis period. Our findings suggest that fiduciary activities induce managers to behave more prudently in lending because such activities are found to increase banks' franchise value. Other non-interest income activities that may be thought to have an influence on lending -such as service charges on deposit accounts -do not appear to have any robust relationship with the quality of credit extended. Moreover, we find little evidence of income or price crosssubsidization between traditional intermediation and non-interest income activities, except for fiduciary activities after the crisis. Furthermore, we find that micro banks suffer from diseconomies in joint production of non-interest income activities and lending.
Introduction
A substantial empirical literature finds that bank diversification into non-interest income areas leads to banking sector instability (DeYoung and Roland, 2001; DeYoung and Rice, 2004; Stiroh, 2004; Stiroh and Rumble, 2006; Stiroh, 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008a; De Jonghe, 2010; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; Moshirian et al., 2011; Brunnermeier et al., 2011; and DeYoung and Torna, 2013) . The link between riskier investment banking revenue and the crisis has also prompted a series of reforms in the US and Europe (Dodd Frank Act, 2010; Liikanen Report, 2012 and the Independent Commission on Banking -Vickers Report, 2011) that recommend restrictions on various banks' non-interest incomebased activities (International Monetary Fund, 2011) .
While the academic literature on bank diversification has focused on performance and stability issues associated with non-traditional banking activities, little attention has been paid to the potential consequences of income diversity for lending. This is somewhat surprising given that combining both traditional lending activities and non-interest businesses can affect bank/borrower relationships which form the major components of banks' charter value. It can also lead to agency problems, loss of focus and the cross-selling of fee and commission-based services as well as potential cost savings through the realization of scope economies.
Relationships with clients influence banks' performance. Banks can collect information (beyond that available publicly) over time via multiple interactions with the same customer (Berger, 1999; Boot, 2000) . Boot (2000) emphasizes that relationship banking is not limited to lending and can cover other financial services. Hence, expanding the scope of client relationships may improve a bank's lending position, as it can provide opportunities to reach a wider array of potential borrowers and more information on client quality. Banks may also have the ability to monitor borrowers that are tied by non-interest activities more closely and more efficiently. Moreover, information obtained from offering multiple products can build new, as well as enhance, existing relationships. Such relationships can potentially increase banks' franchise value and hence increase potential indirect costs of financial distress, leading to more prudent behavior in lending and investment activities (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990; Demsetz et al., 1996 and Gonzalez, 2005 show the negative relationship between banks' charter value and risk-taking). Boot (2003) argues that scale and scope expansion leads to a form of strategic positioning that drives industry consolidation. He points out that distribution channels are essential and that technological developments that make it more effective to interrogate business-line databases encourage scope expansion.
The building of relationships can mitigate risk, as illustrated by Puri et al. (2011) who show that borrowers with prior credit relationships (with German savings banks) default less.
By examining 18,000 bank loans to small Belgian firms, Degryse and Van Cayseele (2000) also show that interest rates tend to fall as the scope of the relationship expands. Hellmann et al. (2008) find that prior relationships with early stage venture capital firms increase the chances of bank loan origination. Firms may also benefit from established bank relationships by signalling their quality resulting in lower loan rates.
Incentives to cross-sell fee and non-interest based products are higher when margins on traditional intermediation are low. Carbo and Rodriguez (2007) show that income from non-traditional activities influence net interest margins through possible cross-subsidization effects and Lepetit et al. (2008b) also find that banks may charge lower rates on loans (underpricing credit risk) if they expect to obtain additional fees from borrowers. Such behavior could, therefore, undermine banks' major role in the financial system. Sound monitoring of borrowers and accurate loan-pricing are essential for the banking industry and the economy as a whole. Banks are expected to produce and convey information on the quality of borrowers which could be biased if non-interest activities provide incentives for weaker loan screening and monitoring.
Moreover, a greater reliance on non-interest activities may increase credit risk due to agency problems or/and a loss of focus. Several studies show that agency problems and information asymmetries stemming from activity diversification outweigh the benefits from scope economies (Laeven and Levine, 2007; Elyasiani and Wang, 2009; Akhigbe and Stevenson 2010) . Others, such as Petersen and Rajan (1995) note that banks extend credit subsidies to young firms and expect to offset the expected loss through future long-run rents.
In a similar vein, a diversified commercial bank may decide to grant loss-making loans to cross-sell profit-making fee and commission-based services. Banks expanding into noninterest income activities may also lose their focus on lending. Moreover, lower credit exposure may encourage managers to be less conservative in their loan-granting activities.
In this paper, we investigate the impact on lending of banks' diversification into six major business lines 1 which we identify as playing an important role among a broader array of non-interest income items. They range from activities such as fiduciary where clients entrusts funds for asset management by the banks, to loan servicing which is directly attached to lending. Generally, these business lines provide banks with the opportunity to have access to more private information and can enable them to reach a wider array of potential customers.
Moreover, they are also likely to expand the scope of relationships with clients beyond merely lending-deposit activities, providing more soft information, financial resources and also enhancing bank franchise values. Alternatively, they may cause agency problems, loss of focus or risk mispricing. We examine the influence of these activities on banks' lending in terms of loan quality and interest spread. We also investigate the role of bank charter/franchise value as well as the possible existence of cost complementarity or diseconomies of joint production between non-interest income activities and lending.
We use quarterly data on 8,287 U.S. commercial banks and our data span from 2003 to 2010 covering the period before and after the [2007] [2008] financial crises. Since the U.S.
banking system is dominated by small banks, we also study banks with less than $100 million in total assets (3,116'micro' commercial banks) separately from the rest of our sample.
Our credit risk analysis for commercial banks with total assets above $100 million indicates that among our various non-interest income activities only an increase in income from fiduciary activities lowers credit risk. In other words, banks that manage clients investments (asset management) have lower credit risk. The impact is more pronounced during the post-crisis period and this finding is robust across different specifications, credit risk proxies and estimation techniques. Further investigation also shows a positive association between fiduciary income and bank's franchise value. We do not find significant evidence to support the conjecture of cross-subsidization between traditional intermediation and noninterest income activities except for fiduciary activities after the crisis with higher income shares from this activity being associated with lower lending-deposit spreads. This result is particularly important, since previous studies (Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007 and Lepetit et al., 2008b) typically find evidence of cross-subsidization effects.
Our analysis of micro commercial banks (those with assets under $100 million)
provides us with little evidence to support any significant link between non-interest income activities and credit risk, and price cross-subsidization 2 . Finally, we investigate for possible pair-wise cost complementarity or alternatively diseconomy of joint production between lending (both secured and unsecured) and non-interest income activities. The analysis shows that micro commercial banks suffer from diseconomy of joint production, whereas non-micro commercial banks neither suffer from diseconomy of joint production nor benefit from cost complementarity (non-jointness).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines our methodology and econometric specifications. Section 3 describes the data and summary statistics. Section 4 discusses the results and finally section 5 concludes.
Econometric Specification and Methodology
Initially, we investigate the impact of non-interest income activities on lending from two perspectives, namely, on how it influences credit risk and interest spreads. For this purpose, we estimate the following models based on DeYoung (1997) and Carbo and Rodriguez (2007) . The variables we consider are the determinants of credit risk and lending-deposit spread highlighted in the literature (McShane and Sharpe, 1985; Clair, 1992; Angbazo, 1997; Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Maudos and De Guevara, 2004; Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Ogura, 2006; Lepetit et al., 2008b; Foos, et al., 2010) :
Credit_Risk i,t = α 0 + α 1 ×Credit_Risk i,t-1 + ∑ ×Non-interest_Income_Activities k,i,t + α 3 ×Capital i,t + α 4 ×Inefficiency i,t + α 5 ×Risk_Weighted_Assets i,t + α 6 ×Loan_Commitment i,t-1 + α 7 ×Loan_Growth i,t-1 + α 8 ×Size i,t-1 + α 9 ×Log(Age) i,t-1 + α 10 ×HHI j,i + α 11 ×Home_Price_Growth j,t + α 12 ×Income_Growth j,t-1 + ∑ + Ɛ i,t
Spread i,t = β 0 + β 1 ×Spread i,t-1 + ∑ ×Non-interest_Income_Activities k,i,t + β 3 ×Capital i,t + β 4 ×Infficiency i,t + β 5 ×Credit_Risk i,t + β 6 ×Liquidity_Risk i,t + β 7 ×Interest_Rate_Risk i,t + β 8 ×Core_Deposit i,t + β 9 ×Loan_Commitment i,t + β 10 ×Wage i,t + β 11 ×Size i,t + β 12 ×Log(Age) i,t + β 13 ×HHI j,t + β 14 ×Home_Price_Growth j,t + β 15 ×Income_Growth j,t + ∑ + ƞ i,t
where individual banks, time dimension and U.S. states in which they operate are represented by i, t and j subscripts, respectively. Variation in credit risk (Credit Risk) and lending-borrowing spread (Spread) are modelled in Equations (1) and (2) We use a dynamic panel setting for our study as suggested by Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007 and DeYoung, 1997 . This allows us to address the persistence in bank risktaking which is also pointed out by previous literature (Delis and Kouretas, 2011, among others) . We estimate the models using the fixed effect technique, similar to Loutskiana (2011) 3 .
DEPENDENT VARIABLES
In model (1) we use the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans (Non-performing Loans) as a proxy for Credit Risk. Non-performing loans consist of non-accrual loans and loans which are past due for 90 days or more and still accruing. As a robustness check, we consider the ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans (Loan Loss Reserve) and the ratio of loan loss provisions to average gross loans (Loan Loss Provision). The former represents managers' appraisal of the loan portfolio quality. It accounts for both non-performing and performing loans. The latter is a flow proxy for loan quality as it shows the quarterly adjustment of loan loss reserves and loans write-off. We also use the more generic Credit Risk proxy, namely the ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets (Risk Weighted Assets) which is considered by the Basel Accord to measure the riskiness of banks' assets and it also accounts for off balance sheet items (Cordell and King, 1995; Jones and King, 1995 and DeYoung, 1997) . These proxies are widely used in the literature as accounting-based credit risk indicators (for instance Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997; Gonzalez, 2005; Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007; Delis and Kouretas, 2011; Fiordelisi, et al., 2011 (Marcus, 1984; Keeley, 1990) .
2) Earnings on/increases in value of cash surrender value of life insurance policies plus fees and commissions from annuity sales (Life Insurance).
Clients can establish a long-run relationship and provide banks with fairly stable funding by entrusting cash surrender value on their policies to the bank. This financial resource is likely to enhance the bank's position in lending.
3) Underwriting income from insurance and reinsurance activities and income from other (non-life) insurance activities (Other Insurance Services).
Other insurance income provides banks with financial resources (pool of premiums) that may also be linked to lending. Banks that have more general insurance business are likely to be aware of the items insured -autos, residential and commercial property, other high value goods -that may require re-financing in the future and therefore can suggest lending opportunities. In addition, existing borrowers may request insurance services which might strengthen relationships and therefore enhance banks' lending quality.
4) Net servicing fees (Loan Servicing).
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Servicers can collect soft information and identify borrowers who regularly fulfil their repayment obligations and this information can be used by banks for future loan origination. However, to collect more late fees, servicing companies may target borrowers less likely to make timely instalments (Wagner, 2009 Our aim is to analyse the implications for credit risk and spread resulting from variation in the aforementioned non-interest income activities. The income from such activities is measured as a percentage of total net operating income following the existing literature (Stiroh, 2004 among others) . For Equation (2), however, we scale the non-interest income items by total assets in lieu of total net operating income, since the latter includes net interest income (alongside non-interest income) and this may cause a mechanical inverse relationship between the share of non-interest income in total operating income and Spread 7 .
CONTROL VARIABLES
The ratio of equity capital to total assets (Capital) is controlled for in both models. On the one hand, higher Capital is associated with lower moral hazard problems and better capitalized banks have greater monitoring incentives (Diamond, 1984) . On the other hand, equity capital provides banks with an enhanced capacity for risk-taking. It can represent equity-holders' risk preferences (McShane and Sharpe, 1985 and Maudos and De Guevara, 2004 ) and banks with a higher capital ratio may target riskier activities and/or a higher spread to compensate for the higher cost of equity compared to debt finance. Berger (1995) argues that capital requirements translate into a premium on margins. We also control for cost inefficiency represented by the ratio of non-interest expense to total operating revenue (Inefficiency) in our models. Less efficient banks are expected to have lower loan quality due to poorer monitoring. They might even have greater incentives for risk-taking (Kwan and Eisenbeis, 1997) . More inefficient banks are expected to increase their spread to cover their higher costs (Altunbas et al., 2001 ).
We include the ratio of the face value of unused credit lines and loan commitments to total assets (Loan Commitment) in our analysis. Borrowers of banks with higher Loan Commitment face, on average, lower liquidity shocks and have the capacity to be more leveraged. As such, we expect a negative relationship between Loan Commitment and Credit Risk. Berg et al. (2013) show that credit lines act as insurance for borrowers against liquidity shocks and the related fees including commitment fees smooth borrowing costs across different scenarios (namely, the presence and absence of liquidity shocks). As such, higher
Loan Commitment may represent greater borrowing cost smoothing and lower Spread.
In our Credit Risk model (1) we control for Risk Weighted Assets, as non-performing loans depend on the riskiness of portfolio structure and Risk Weighted Assets captures a number of risk factors such as borrowers' type and the existence of collateral (Berger and DeYoung, 1997) .
We add the quarterly growth rate of gross loans (Loan Growth) to the Credit Risk model, since the literature shows a negative relationship between credit expansion and loan quality (Clair, 1992; Dell'Ariccia and Marquez, 2006; Ogura, 2006; Foos, et al., 2010) .
In the Spread model (model 2), we introduce a proxy for credit risk (Loan Loss Provision), the ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities (to capture liquidity risk) and the difference between the annualized federal funds rate and the implicit interest rate on customer deposits as a measure of interest rate risk. We expect higher credit, liquidity or interest rate risk to translate into higher Spread (Angbazo, 1997; Carbo and Rodriguez, 2007 and Schumacher, 2000 among others) . The share of core deposits in total liabilities (Core Deposit) is also included in Equation (2), as Spread depends on the structure of debt financing. We also consider the salaries and employee benefits divided by number of full time equivalent employees (Wage) as a proxy for employees' expertise. Banks with greater expertise are expected to have a higher Spread, since they are expected to offer more specialized and higher valued services.
We also control for bank size by including the logarithm of total assets (Size) in both models. Size can have several impacts on Credit Risk and Spread: Large and small banks have different business models, the former relying more heavily on non-interest generating activities given their greater capacity to benefit from diversification and scale economies (Hughes et al., 2001) . Larger banks may also hold riskier loan portfolios to benefit from safety net subsidies (Kane, 2010) . Moreover, bigger banks mainly deal with larger and more transparent borrowers, while small banks are more likely to lend to opaque firms which may be more risky. Alternatively, large borrowers generally have easier access to financial markets as a substitute for bank lending. Hence, large banks could face higher competition, resulting in greater risk-taking and lower spreads. The logarithm of the bank's age (Log(Age)) is expected to capture the impact of longevity and hence experience on the bank's Credit Risk and Spread.
In both models, we attempt to capture state-level heterogeneity by including indexes for banking market concentration (HHI), house prices (House Price Growth) and growth in personal income (Income Growth). Finally, yearly fixed effects are controlled for by introducing seven year dummies. Table A1 in the appendix outlines the variables used in our models.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical observations. The reason for examining the smallest banks separately is that the U.S. banking system is dominated by small banks with a relatively different business model. As banks become larger their funding strategy, loan composition and income structure tend to change. [ home price index, on average, has experienced a 0.55% quarterly growth during the study period. Personal income has also grown, on average, at the rate of 1.06% in the [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] time period.
Empirical Results
CREDIT RISK
We estimate the Credit Risk model (Equation (1)) using our quarterly panel data to investigate whether non-interest income activities have any significant impact on banks' loan quality. We apply the fixed effect technique with standard errors clustered at the bank level. Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) both claim that when the dimensions of panel are extremely unbalanced, there is no need to double cluster at all; however, the former believes that single-clustering on the more frequent dimension (bank in our case) is almost identical to clustering by both dimensions, whereas the latter argues that in this case, single-clustering on the less frequent dimension (time in our case) removes the bias. 14 The results are not reported here, but are available from the authors upon request. Table IV presents the results of our analysis for the three sub-periods, using quarterly data of 4,371
Non-Micro Commercial Banks.
Column (1) illustrates the estimation of the Credit Risk Model (Equation (1)), using 
FIDUCIARY ACTIVITIES AND CREDIT RISK -CAUSALITY TESTS
We find that fiduciary activities can lower credit risk; however, it might be argued that clients have a strong preference for using reputable and conservative banks for their fiduciary activities. In this sub-section, we address this causal relationship, using the Granger causality test (1969) which is widely applied in the literature (Berger, 1995; Rossi, et al., 2009; Fiordelisi et al. 2011, among others) . We adopt the Berger and DeYoung (1997) 
Where the individual banks, time dimension and states are represented by i, t and j subscripts, respectively. On the right-hand-side of Equations (3) and (4) Columns (3) and (4) illustrate our estimations of Equation (4) 
Where individual banks, time dimension and states are represented by i, t and j subscripts, respectively. We use the market to book value of equity capital (Market to Book Value) as the primary proxy for bank franchise value and Tobin's Q (Tobin's Q) as an alternative indicator (Keeley, 1990 and Gonzalez, 2005 Banks with higher credit risk and inefficiency are expected to have lower franchise values.
We also control for capital strength using the equity capital to assets ratio as banks with less capital are likely to be more risky and hence have lower franchise value. Market share is expected to be positively linked to charter value (Opler and Titman, 1994 (7) and (8). The results support our previous finding: an increase in the income share of fiduciary activities increases banks' franchise value.
[ The linkage of the non-interest income activities with loan quality and spreads may be due to informational and/or cost synergies. In this section, we investigate whether pair-wise cost complementarity exists between lending and the non-interest income activities that might contribute to joint production 17 . As such, we examine whether the marginal cost of producing loans decreases when they are generated jointly with non-interest income activities. Appendix A2 illustrates our multi-product cost function from which marginal costs are derived.
In a multi-product firm the pair-wise cost complementarity (PCC) between two products exists when an increase in product A lowers the marginal cost of producing product B (Clark, 1988) . The measure of cost complementarity is as follows:
PCC < 0 implies the existence of cost complementarity between products A and B. The necessary condition for the existence of cost complementarity (PCC<0) is:
17 Informational synergy analysis requires detailed data on clients' relationship which are not available. PCC = 0 implies the non-jointness or absence of cost complementarities. At any non-zero production level of Y A and Y B , . Hence, non-jointness requires:
PCC > 0 implies existence of diseconomy of joint production. In column (1), the first row, the result shows that the necessary condition for the existence of diseconomies of joint production between non-interest income activities and secured loans is realized, whereas in the second row, we find the necessary condition for the existence of cost complementarity between non-interest income activities and unsecured loans.
However, column (2) shows that the sufficiency condition for the existence of diseconomy of joint production or cost complementarity is not fulfilled and highlights non-jointness 18 . In column (3) we observe that the marginal cost of secured loans is around 9.7% which is greater than the marginal cost of unsecured loans equal to 2.2%.
Columns (4) to (6) exhibit the study of Micro Commercial Banks. In column (4), the findings indicate that the necessary condition for diseconomies of joint production of noninterest income activities with secured and unsecured loans is realized. Column (5) shows that the sufficiency condition for diseconomies of joint production of non-interest income activities 18 Normally total cost is much less than the products of loans (whether Secured or Unsecured) with other financial services (in our case the non-interest income businesses). Hence, the first component of the measure of cost complementarity, is too small such that its product with the second component makes the measure very close to zero, implying non-jointness.
with secured and unsecured loans is fulfilled. The marginal cost of secured and unsecured loans of Micro Commercial Banks, displayed in column (6), is equal to 5.33% and 5.15%, respectively. The effect of diseconomies of joint production is economically meaningful. One dollar increase in non-interest income equals 0.12% (0.12%= ) and 0.09% (0.09%= ) increase in the marginal cost of secured and unsecured loans, respectively.
[
TABLE VII]
As a robustness check, we also follow the production approach (Berger and DeYoung, 1997 among others) and include transaction deposits in our model as a further output. The results are presented in rows (3) and (4) and are similar to our previous findings, except for the secured loans of Non-Micro Commercial Banks, where we find that the necessary condition for cost complementarity between secured loans and non-interest income is realized.
In rows (5) to (8), we replicate our analysis in the first four rows using the fixed effect technique for estimation of total cost function in lieu of stochastic frontier analysis. The results are in line with our previous findings. Overall, we find that Micro Commercial Banks suffer from diseconomies of joint production, whereas Non-Micro Commercial Banks do not benefit (or suffer) from economies (or diseconomies) of scope.
FURTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS
We find that an increase in income share of fiduciary activities lowers credit risk. As a further robustness check and in order to address endogeneity issues, we estimate our model (Equation (1)) using the two step system GMM technique introduced by Roodman (2006 (4), we limit the instruments of system GMM estimators to the second lag of the dependent variable which reduces the number of instruments from 416 to 234. This time, the Sargan test rejects the null merely at the ten percent significance level, whereas our finding in the previous column remains almost unchanged. In column (3), we scale the noninterest income items by total assets in lieu of total net operating income. In this specification the result persists and the Sargan test of over-identification does not reject the null hypothesis.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper analyzes the impact of non-interest income activities on banks' lending in terms of credit quality and spread. Agency problems and a potential loss of focus associated with diversification into non-interest income businesses may cause deterioration in loan quality. Alternatively, expanding client relationships can improve the quality of banks' credit by, providing relatively stable financial resources, more soft information, greater cross-selling opportunities and (ultimately) improved franchise value. Banks with a wider scope of relationships are able to reach more potential borrowers. Moreover, non-interest earnings may also influence banks' interest spread through possible cross-subsidization effects. We find little evidence to support the prevalent view in the literature that there is cross-subsidization between traditional intermediation and non-interest income activities except for fiduciary in the post-crisis period where we observe that a higher income share of fiduciary activities is associated with lower lending-deposit spreads.
The analysis of micro commercial banks provides us with little evidence of any link between our non-interest income variables and credit risk. Finally, we investigate whether pair-wise cost complementarity or alternatively diseconomies of joint production exist between lending (both secured and unsecured) and non-interest income activities. We do not find any evidence to support the existence of cost complementarity. Our results even show that micro commercial banks actually suffer from diseconomies of joint production. 
Appendices
Dependent Variables Description
Non-performing Loans
The ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans. Non-performing loans consist of non-accrual loans and loans which are past due for 90 days or more and still accruing.
Loan Loss Reserve
The ratio of loan loss reserves to gross loans. Loan loss reserve is determined by managers for the loan portfolio, including both performing and impaired loans.
Loan Loss Provision
The ratio of loan loss provision to average gross loans. Loan loss provision is the expense that banks incur to increase the loan loss reserve or writing off a loan. It can be negative, when the required loan loss reserve is lower than the existing level.
Risk Weighted Assets
The ratio of risk weighted assets to total assets. Risk weighted assets are defined by the Basel Accord to measure the riskiness of banks' assets, including off balance sheet items.
Spread
Net interest spread equals to (Interest income / average earning assets) -(interest expense / average interest-bearing liabilities).
Market to Book Value
The market value of equity capital divided by total book value of equity capital.
Tobin's Q
The market value of equity capital plus the book value of total liabilities divided by the book value of total assets.
Variable of Interest
Fiduciary
Income from fiduciary activities.
Life Insurance
Earnings on/increase in value of cash surrender value of life insurance plus fees and commissions from annuity sales.
Other Insurance Services
Underwriting income from insurance and reinsurance activities and income from other insurance activities.
Loan Servicing
Net servicing fees.
Loan Sale
Net gains (losses) on sales of loans and leases and net securitization income.
Service Charge
Service charges on deposit accounts in domestic offices, income and fees from the printing and sale of checks, income and fees from automated teller machines and bank card and credit card interchange fees.
Control Variables
Capital Equity capital to asset ratio.
Inefficiency
Total non-interest expense divided by total operating revenue.
Core Deposit
The share of core deposits in total liabilities.
Liquid Asset
The ratio of liquid assets to total liabilities.
Interest Rate Risk
The difference between the annualized federal funds rate and the implicit interest rate of deposits.
Loan Commitment
The ratio of face value of unused credit lines and loans commitment to total assets.
Loan Growth
Quarterly growth rate of gross loans.
Wage
The salaries and employee benefits divided by number of full time equivalent employees.
Market Share
The share of a bank's total assets in the total assets of banks aggregated at the state-level.
Size
Logarithm of total assets.
Log(Age)
Logarithm of bank's age.
HHI
Hirschman-Herfindahl index (HHI) is a proxy for market concentration: ∑ ( ∑ ⁄ ) where individual banks, time dimension and U.S. states in which they operate are represented by i, t and j subscripts, respectively. It has a value between zero and one. Higher values show that the market is more concentrated.
Home Price Index Growth
Quarterly growth rate of home price index per state, retrieved from the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight.
Personal Income Growth
Quarterly growth rate in personal income per state, collected from Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Other Non-interest Income Activities
Venture Capital Venture capital revenue.
Securities Brokerage
Fees and commission from securities brokerage.
Investment Banking
Investment banking, advisory, and underwriting fees and commissions.
Trading
Trading revenue and net change in the fair values of financial instruments accounted for under a fair value option.
Other Assets Sales
Net gains (losses) on sales of other real estate owned, net gains (losses) on sales of other assets (excluding securities), rent and other income from other real estate owned.
Other Activities
Other non-interest income.
Appendix A2. Cost Complementarities Analysis -Cost Function & Descriptive Statistics
Using the intermediation approach (Berger and Mester, 1997 among others), we set-up the following multi-product cost function with a trans-logarithmic functional form (Berndt and Christensen, 1973) :
Wherein TC is the total costs including total interest and non-interest expenses; Y is the Z is the total capital equity and is added to the model to control for unmeasured cost of equity capital. Banks with higher equity capital have lower total costs as they have less debt financing and hence interest expense, assuming all other factors equal (Hughes and Mester, 2013) .
We consider the homogeneity and symmetry assumptions which require:
We also impose input price homogeneity restrictions (an increase in all input prices increases the total costs by the same percentage) on the cost function parameters by dividing all input prices (W1 and W2) and total costs (TC) with one other factor price (W3).
The total cost function is estimated using a stochastic frontier approach introduced by Aigner et al. (1977) which fits the cost function to best practice banks. This approach assumes that the error term (ɛ) has two components which are independently distributed: One idiosyncratic error (or random noise) term with a symmetric distribution (ʋ) and the inefficiency term with a strictly nonnegative distribution (u). We assume that the inefficiency component follows a time-varying decay model proposed by Battese and Coelli (1992) , so ( ) . T i is the last period in the i th panel and ƞ is the parameter to be estimated. Table A2 presents the descriptive statistics of the total costs, output and input price vectors and total equity capital for Micro and Non-Micro Commercial Banks. TC is the total costs including total interest and non-interest expenses; Y1 = Loans secured by real estate; Y2 = Loans unsecured on real estate; Y3 = Securities plus federal funds sold and securities purchased under agreements to resell; Y4 = total off-balance sheet items; Y5 = the non-interest income activities, including Fiduciary, Life Insurance, Other Insurance Services and Loan Servicing; Y6 = Service Charge; Y7 = Total transaction accounts (including total demand deposits); W1 = salary expenses divided by number of full-time equivalent employees; W2 = expenses of premises and fixed assets divided by total fixed assets; W3 = total interest expense divided by interest-bearing liabilities. Z = the total capital equity. Total costs (TC), output vectors (Ys) and capital equity (Z) are in million $ and the input prices (Ws) are in percentage. We perform the Arellano and Bond (AB) test (1991) for serial correlation in the error terms and Sargan test of overidentification, where the null hypothesis is joint validity of moment conditions. The Sargan (1958) J test result rejects the null hypothesis. In column (2), we limit the instruments of system GMM estimators to the second lag of dependent variable to reduce the number of instruments from 416 to 234. The results show that Sargan test rejects the null merely at 10 percent significance level. In column (3) we scale the non-interest income items by total assets in lieu of total net operating income and estimate our model the same specifications and techniques used in the column.
( (-5 .50) Capital (α3) -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.031*** (-6 .50) (-6 .96) (-7 .06) Inefficiency (α4) 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** (7.29) (6.44) (6.21) Risk Weighted Assets (α5) 0.004*** 0.003*** 0.003*** (3.59) (3.15) (3.44) Loan Commitment (α6) -0.013*** -0.012*** -0.012*** (-4 .49) (-3 .89) 0.012*** 0.013*** 0.012*** (3.76) (4.12) (3.79) Size (α8) 0.104*** 0.099*** 0.106*** (8.03) (7.56) (8.30) Log(Age) (α9) -0.050*** -0.050*** -0.049*** (-4.45 ) (-4 .75) (-4 .72) HHI (α10) 0.201*** 0.179*** 0.164*** (3.41) (3.25) (2.97) Home Price Growth (α11) -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.020*** (-3 .57) (-3 .78) (-3 .58) Income Growth (α12) -0.076*** -0.059*** -0.064*** (-12.58 ) (-9 .01) (-9 See Table A1 for variable definitions. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. In columns (1) to (7) (-4.10 ) (-4.20 ) (-2 .51) (-1.76 ) (-0 .74) (0.55) (-4.96) (1.54) Capital (α3) -0.023*** -0.023*** -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.010*** -0.027*** 0.105*** -0.019*** (-8.97 ) (-8.93 ) (-7.90 ) (-7.48 ) (-9 .38) (-10 .65) (7.81) (-5 (α6) -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.004*** -0.012*** 0.266*** -0.013*** (-10.50 ) (-10.50 ) (-9 .83) (-7 .02) (-8.11 ) (28.89) (-4 .21) Loan Growth (α7) -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.130*** -0.007*** (-10.22 ) (-9 .89) (-7.94 ) (-24.19 ) (-11.37 (α11) -0.020*** -0.004*** -0.012*** -0.033*** -0.026*** (-7.85 ) (-4 .49) (-6 .09) (-3.90 ) (-6 .34) Income Growth (α12) -0.015*** -0.004*** 0.001 -0.011 -0.002 (-6.23 ) (-4 .78) (0.34) (-1.25 ) (-0 .55) Constant (α0) -0.131*** -0.134*** -0.048*** -0.019* 0.002 -0.033*** -0.782*** -0.035*** (-24.13 ) (-23.96 ) (-5 .71) (-1.94 ) (0.66) (-4 .55) (-14 .57) (-2.60 See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. (-25.73 ) (-26 .24) (-27 .60) (-25 .64) (-24 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** (-25.62 ) (-25.30 ) (-25.40 ) (-23.25 ) (-14.22 See Table A1 for variable definitions. Standard errors are adjusted for clusters in banks. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% respectively. (-0.38) (0.14) (2.00) (-4 .81) (9.41) Capital -0.018*** -0.010*** -0.027*** 0.121*** 0.014*** (-6.71 ) (-9 .63) (-10.83 (-26 .24) Risk Weighted Assets 0.002*** -0.000 0.002*** (2.60) (-0.33 ) (3.14) Loan Commitment -0.020*** -0.005*** -0.013*** 0.278*** 0.002*** (-10.40 ) (-7 .68) (-8.87 ) (31.09) (3.31) Loan Growth -0.007*** -0.009*** -0.006*** 0.131*** (-8.48 ) (-24 .14) (-11.34 (2), we add the fourth lagged value to our analysis. Column (3) illustrates our estimation of the Fiduciary model (Equation (7) (3) and (4), respectively. Capital is included in the fifth column. Column (6) displays the result when we control for Market Share. In column (7) we include state-level control variables, i.e. HHI, Home Price Growth and Income Growth. In column (8), we scale non-interest income items by total assets in lieu of total operating income. In columns (9) and (10) we use Tobin's Q as the alternative proxy for Franchise Value and re-estimate our model with the same specifications of columns (7) and (8). Tobin's Q is defined as the market value of capital equity plus book value of total liabilities divided by book value of total assets. We estimate our model using fixed effect technique and following Petersen (2009) and Thompson (2011) we cluster standard errors at both bank and time levels. The first three columns present the analysis for the Non-Micro Commercial Banks and columns (4) to (6) exhibit the results for Micro Commercial Banks. Columns (1) and (4) display the necessary condition for the existence of cost complementarities or diseconomy of joint production between the non-interest income activities and secured or unsecured loans. In columns (2) and (5) the measure of cost complementarities (or diseconomy of joint production) are illustrated. See Table A1 for variable definitions. In the first four rows we use stochastic frontier analysis to estimate our total cost function, whereas rows (5) to (8) exhibit the results when we employ the fixed effect technique for our estimations. We adopt two cost functions: intermediation approach (Berger and Mester, 1997 among others) and production approach (Berger and DeYoung, 1997 among others). 
